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Introduction
made drastic changes in the accounting treatment of goodwill. Effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2001 , SFAS 142 ended the amortization of goodwill and instead required firms to periodically test their goodwill for impairment. Previously, goodwill was accounted for under APB Opinion No. 17, Intangible Assets (APB 17) and was viewed by the FASB as a wasting asset. Thus, goodwill was amortized straight-line for a period of up to 40 years. By ending the systematic amortization of goodwill under SFAS 142, the FASB signaled that it now views goodwill as an indefinite-life asset.
SFAS 142 affects earnings in two ways.
i First, many firms are required to take sizable goodwill impairments if they cannot justify the amount of goodwill being carried on their balance sheets. Investors should be able to approximate these impairments using data from prior financial statements and techniques commonly used in firm valuation. Investors may view these impairments as current realizations of previous economic events, in which case these impairments would not be value relevant for current returns. Alternatively, if investors do not realize that adoption-year goodwill impairments under *Dr. George R. Wilson, Department of Accounting, College of Business, Butler University. Email: grwilson@butler.edu **Dr. James C. Hansen, Department of Accounting, Anderson School of Management, University of New Mexico. Email: jh56@unm.edu SFAS 142 are the result of past economic events, they may view these impairments as new, value relevant information rather than the realization of a previous economic event.
Second, all firms who previously amortized goodwill receive a "cosmetic" boost to their earnings due to the non-amortization of goodwill following SFAS 142 adoption. The boost is cosmetic because it results strictly from a change in accounting standards and not from the activity of the firm itself. Investors could estimate this boost using data from prior financial statements. Therefore eliminating goodwill amortization should not influence rational investors' firm valuations. In contrast, functionally fixated investors would not separate earnings into its various components. Thus, they may react to the boost in earnings from SFAS 142 in the same manner they would react to other earnings innovations (e.g. from a firm's normal activities). This study investigates whether investors assign value relevance to adoption-year goodwill impairments and to the increase in earnings resulting from goodwill non-amortization. Furthermore, this study investigates whether the assigned value relevance is due to new information content or due to functional fixation.
This study is important because if offers evidence about investors' reactions, both rational and irrational, to a newly issued accounting standard. The question of whether investors see new, value relevant information in adoption-year goodwill impairments is interesting because it examines investors' current reactions to a prior unrealized economic event. If investors are able to accurately estimate the changes in goodwill value when those changes occur, then there should be no significant price reaction to the realization of those changes in value at a later date.
The question of whether investors functionally fixate on reported accounting earnings is particularly interesting in this setting for two reasons. First, prior studies have investigated functional fixation using relatively complex accounting events such as debtfor-equity swaps (Hand 1990 ) and deferred tax adjustments (Chen & Schoderbek 2000) . The earnings boost from SFAS 142 results simply from the removal of one visible number -goodwill amortization. Second, the prior accounting events used to study functional fixation materially affected a relatively small number of firms, whereas SFAS 142 materially affects a much larger cross-sections of firms. Both the lack of accounting complexity and the widespread impact of SFAS 142 should help investors recognize and understand how earnings are affected. Thus, examining functional fixation in this setting goes beyond confirming the existence of functional fixation and allows one to draw inferences about the depth of investors' functional fixation.
To provide evidence on how investors react to the realization of goodwill impairments and whether investors functionally fixate on reported earnings, we perform regression analysis on a sample of 472 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms that reported goodwill on their balance sheets at the end of 2001 and adopted SFAS in the first quarter of 2002. We regress three-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) calculated using the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French 1992) on components of earnings change, goodwill impairment, and institutional ownership. We separate the seasonally adjusted earnings change into two components: (1) the earnings change from firm operations and (2) the earnings change from goodwill non-amortization savings. We then interact these two earnings components with indicator variables for goodwill impairment and level of institutional ownership. Results indicate that investors do find new, value relevant information in adoption year goodwill impairments. This suggests that investors were unable to accurately estimate prior unrealized goodwill impairments. These results are consistent with prior findings (Chen et al. 2008) . Results also indicate that investors assign value relevance to the component of earnings change due to goodwill amortization savings, and that this assignment of value relevance is due to functional fixation. Unsophisticated investors do not distinguish between earnings changes from normal operations and earnings changes from goodwill non-amortization. However, sophisticated investors do value the two earnings change components differently.
In summary, this study provides evidence that investors find new, value relevant information in adoption-year goodwill impairments and the component of earnings change due to goodwill non-amortization. Further analysis indicates that investors functionally fixate on reported accounting earnings following the adoption of SFAS 142.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 discusses sample selection. Section 4 describes empirical methods and discusses the results, and Section 5 summarizes the study and offers conclusions.
Background and Hypotheses

Background
With the issuance of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141, Business Combinations, (SFAS 141) and SFAS 142, the FASB created a comprehensive system for dealing with goodwill. SFAS 141 eliminates the pooling of interests method for business combinations and instead requires the use of the purchase method. SFAS 141 is designed to increase comparability between firms by requiring a consistent accounting method for business combinations. In addition to requiring purchase method accounting, SFAS 141 gives additional guidance on how to classify goodwill and other intangible assets at the time of purchase. SFAS 142 dovetails with SFAS 141 by changing the accounting treatment of previously recognized goodwill and newly recognized goodwill following purchase. Goodwill accounting was governed by APB 17 prior to the issuance of SFAS 142. Under APB 17, goodwill was viewed as a wasting asset that should be systematically amortized. SFAS 142 completely changes the way that the FASB views goodwill. Under SFAS 142, goodwill is viewed as an intangible asset having an indefinite life, and should therefore not be amortized at all.
Rather than amortizing goodwill, firms are now required to periodically test their goodwill for impairment using a two-step fair-value-based testing process. Firms must first compare the carrying value of each of their reporting units to the estimated fair value of that unit. If the fair value of the reporting unit is higher than the carrying value, no impairment exists. If the carrying value exceeds the fair value, then a second test must be conducted comparing the estimated value of the goodwill assigned to the reporting unit to the carrying value of the goodwill assigned to the reporting unit in order to determine the amount of the goodwill impairment. The effects of the elimination of goodwill amortization and the recognition of goodwill impairments on the valuation judgments of investors are the focus of this study.
Goodwill's Value Relevance
The literature on goodwill's relation with market value is sparse. However, the existing literature seems to tell a consistent story -goodwill amortization has little ability to explain market prices or returns prior to SFAS 142. Jennings et al. (2001) use a sample of 3,431 firm-years from 1993 -1998 to examine the effect of goodwill data on the usefulness of earnings. They regress security prices on EPS before goodwill amortization; then they again regress security prices on EPS after goodwill amortization. They find that in each of their sample years the R-squared for EPS before goodwill amortization explains more of the cross-sectional distribution of share prices than EPS after goodwill amortization. Next they regress share prices on EPS before goodwill amortization and goodwill amortization. They expect that goodwill amortization would have a significant negative coefficient if it has any ability to explain share prices. Instead, they find that goodwill amortization has an insignificant coefficient. They conclude that goodwill amortization has no ability to explain share prices. Moehrle et al. (2001) examine the relative explanatory power of cash flows from operations (CFO), earnings before goodwill amortization, and earnings after goodwill amortization for security prices. They regress 12-month market adjusted returns on each performance measure and a one-period lag of each measure and find that the earnings measures outperform the CFO measure. However, similar to Jennings et al. (2001) they find that goodwill adds no explanatory power to earnings. Henning et al. (2000) offer evidence that investors generally view goodwill as a nonwasting asset by examining goodwill in the year of acquisition. They separate goodwill into its various components and then regress 12-month returns on earnings and the goodwill components. They find a significant negative relation between returns and the component of goodwill associated with overpayment. However, they find that in future years goodwill amortization has no relation with returns.
One paper does offer some evidence that goodwill has some explanatory power in the capital markets. Jennings et al. (1996) regress market value of equity (MVE) on various components of expected future earnings, including goodwill amortization. They find a negative association between goodwill amortization and MVE.
However, this association is much weaker than the association between MVE and other earnings components. They conclude that the amortization period for goodwill is inaccurate for most firms in their sample. Hand (1990) proposes and tests the extended functional fixation hypothesis (EFFH). The EFFH states that the marginal investor (whether sophisticated or naïve) determines whether a particular security reacts in a manner consistent with the efficient capital markets hypothesis or in a manner consistent with functional fixation. He further states that the likelihood that the marginal investor is a sophisticated investor rises as a firm's level of institutional ownership rises. In his empirical analysis, he uses the reannouncement of gains from 232 debt-for-equity swaps that took place from 1981 -1984 to test the EFFH. For each swap, the gain was announced at the time the swap took place. In an efficient market, investors will not react a second time to the reannouncement of the swap gain at the quarterly earnings announcement. However, a functionally fixated investor (i.e. unsophisticated investor) would react to the reannouncement of a previously announced gain. Hand (1990) regresses two-day excess stock returns around the swap quarter's earnings announcement on a measure of unexpected earnings and the swap gain. He also interacts the swap gain with each firm's level of institutional ownership to proxy for investor sophistication. His results indicate that investors do react positively to the reannouncement of the gain, and that the likelihood of investors reacting to the reannouncement increases as the level of institutional ownership decreases. Chen and Schoderbek (2000) test functional fixation by examining deferred tax adjustments following the 1993 tax rate increase. They first analyze the behavior of analysts to see whether they rationally impounded estimates of deferred tax adjustments into their forecasts. To do this, they regress forecast errors on the deferred tax adjustments and unexpected items. They conclude that analysts did not impound the available information about deferred tax adjustments into their forecasts. They next test for functional fixation by investors around the 1993 third quarter earnings announcement.
Functional Fixation
ii They regress two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on the deferred tax adjustments, unexpected items, and the forecast error excluding the tax adjustments and unexpected items. Similar to the analyst results, they find that investors did not anticipate the effect of deferred tax adjustments on earnings, and that they impounded the earnings from the deferred tax adjustments into prices at the same rate as they impounded recurring earnings into prices.
Chen & Schoderbek then go on to investigate the impact of institutional ownership, voluntary disclosure of deferred tax adjustments, the sign of the adjustment, and the magnitude of the adjustment on functional fixation. They find that analysts were unaffected by these firm characteristics, but that investor fixation is more pronounced for positive deferred tax adjustments and when the tax adjustments are not voluntarily disclosed.
Unlike Hand (1990) , they find no evidence that institutional ownership affects investors' fixation. They speculate that investors may be unable to adjust for accounting numbers that result from complex changes.
Hypotheses
The vast majority of prior research on goodwill amortization's value relevance indicates that goodwill amortization has little or no value relevance. This lack of value relevance was cited by the FASB when describing the reasons for issuing SFAS 142 (FASB 2001) . Prior to SFAS 142, goodwill amortization was subtracted as an expense on the income statement. Following SFAS 142, goodwill amortization is no longer subtracted and thus its absence results in an increase in earnings. Just as goodwill amortization had no value relevance prior to SFAS 142, there is no reason to believe that the increase in earnings that results from the absence of goodwill amortization will have value relevance post SFAS 142. This leads to my first hypothesis stated in null form:
H1:
The increase in earnings due to goodwill non-amortization has no value relevance.
Despite prior evidence that goodwill amortization has no value relevance, there are two reasons to believe that investors may assign value relevance to the increase in earnings due to goodwill non-amortization. First, functional fixation suggests that investors may disregard the methods used to calculate earnings. If investors are functionally fixated they would value the increase in earnings from goodwill non-amortization similarly to a change in earnings from a firm's normal activities. A second possibility is that the earnings increase from goodwill amortization contains new value relevant information for investors. At the same time that SFAS 142 eliminates goodwill amortization, it also implements testing for goodwill impairments. If the amount of goodwill amortization (non-amortization) is related to the likelihood of goodwill impairment, then the earnings increase resulting from goodwill non-amortization will be value relevant.
To determine whether investors behave in a manner consistent with functional fixation, we analyze whether the reaction to the earnings increase resulting from goodwill nonamortization varies between investor types. If functional fixation exists in this setting, then there will be a significant difference in the way that sophisticated and unsophisticated investors react to the change in earnings resulting from goodwill nonamortization. However, if the change in earnings due to goodwill non-amortization has value relevance because of a relation with goodwill impairments, there should be no difference in the reaction by different types of investors. This leads to my second hypothesis stated in null form: H2: Unsophisticated investors do not functionally fixate on reported accounting numbers SFAS 142 requires firms to periodically evaluate their goodwill for impairment beginning in fiscal years starting after December 15, 2001. Had SFAS 142 been in effect in earlier years, goodwill impairments would have occurred in those years. Therefore, initial goodwill impairments following the adoption of SFAS 142 represent a "catch up" adjustment. In other words, the goodwill impairment occurring in 2002 under SFAS 142 is the result of economic events that occurred in prior years. The methods used to determine whether an impairment exists under SFAS 142 are fair value methods that have been commonly used for firm and asset valuation in the past. In an efficient market, rational investors would react to a firm's need for goodwill impairment when the economic events causing that need occur regardless of whether or not the firm actually realizes the goodwill impairment at that time. This leads to my third hypothesis:
H3: Goodwill impairments due to the adoption of SFAS 142 will not have value relevance.
Sample Selection and SFAS 142 Earnings Effect
Sample Selection Procedures
Our initial sample consists of 600 randomly selected firms that have positive amounts of goodwill listed in the Compustat database for the fourth-quarter of 2001 and are traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Panel A of table 1 provides a complete description of the sample selection procedure. We require sample firms to have daily returns data listed in the CRSP database. This requirement eliminates 8 firms bringing the sample to 592 firms. 
SFAS 142 Earnings Effects
Empirical Methods and Results
To provide evidence about investors' reaction to goodwill savings resulting from SFAS 142, we regress three-day cumulative abnormal returns on the component of seasonal change in earnings due to normal firm activity and the component of seasonal change in earnings due to goodwill savings.
The dependent variable, i CAR , is the three-day cumulative abnormal return measured from day -1 to day +1 where day 0 is the date of earnings announcement. i CAR is computed using the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French 1992) . To control for heteroskedasticity, all independent variables are scaled by total assets lagged four quarters.
is the component of seasonal change in earnings that is due to normal firm activity (e.g. not due to SFAS 142). It is calculated as the seasonal change in earnings from first-quarter 2001 to first-quarter 2002 minus the portion of seasonal change in earnings due to SFAS 142. Hypothesis 1 states that investors do not assign value relevance to the increase in earnings due to goodwill amortization savings since that increase in earnings results strictly from a change in accounting standards. However, results presented in Table 2 , Column 1 indicate that i E 142 _  , the change in earnings due to goodwill amortization savings, has a positive, significant coefficient of 0.14 (t = 5.02). 
Hypothesis 3 states that goodwill impairments resulting from SFAS 142 are not value relevant for current returns because these impairments are "catch up" impairments caused by economic events in prior periods. In an efficient market, rational investors would react to the needed goodwill impairment regardless of whether the impairment is realized in that period. However, we find ( has an insignificant coefficient of 0.03 (t = 0.17). This means that investors discount the portion of earnings change due to normal firm activity when a goodwill impairment exists, but they do not discount the portion of earnings change due to goodwill amortization savings.
In summary, results presented in table 2 indicate that investors find value relevant information in adoption-year goodwill impairments, that investors find value relevant information in the increase in earnings change due to goodwill amortization savings, and that the value relevance of the increase in earnings change due to goodwill amortization is the result of functional fixation. 
Conclusions
SFAS 142 makes serious changes in the accounting treatment of goodwill by ending the amortization of goodwill and requiring firms to periodically test their goodwill for impairment. This affects earnings both through goodwill impairments and through the cessation of goodwill amortization. This study investigates whether investors assign value relevance to these goodwill impairments and to the change in earnings resulting from goodwill non-amortization. Furthermore, this study investigates whether the assigned value relevance is due to new information content or due to functional fixation. This study is important because if offers evidence about investors' reactions, both rational and irrational, to a newly issued accounting standard. The question of whether investors functionally fixate on reported accounting earnings is particularly interesting in this setting because prior studies have investigated functional fixation using relatively complex accounting events such as debt-for-equity swaps (Hand 1990 ) and deferred tax adjustments (Chen & Schoderbek 2000) , and because SFAS 142 materially affects a large cross-sections of firms. Both the lack of accounting complexity and the widespread impact of SFAS 142 should help investors recognize and understand how earnings are affected. Thus, examining functional fixation in this setting goes beyond confirming the existence of functional fixation and allows one to draw inferences about the depth of investors' functional fixation.
To provide evidence on how investors react to the realization of goodwill impairments and whether investors functionally fixate on reported earnings, we perform regression analysis on a sample of 472 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms that reported goodwill on their balance sheets at the end of 2001 and adopted SFAS in the first quarter of 2002. We find that investors do find new, value relevant information in adoption year goodwill impairments. This suggests that investors were unable to accurately estimate prior unrealized goodwill impairments. These results are consistent with prior findings (Chen et al. 2008) . Results also indicate that investors assign value relevance to the component of earnings change due to goodwill amortization savings, and that this assignment of value relevance is due to functional fixation. Unsophisticated investors do not distinguish between earnings changes from normal operations and earnings changes from goodwill non-amortization. However, sophisticated investors do value the two earnings change components differently.
Endnotes
i SFAS 142 was superseded by Intangibles -Goodwill and Other (Topic 350). Although the new codification made few changes to the treatment of goodwill, references in this paper continue to be to SFAS 142 since it is the adoption of that specific standard on which we focus. 
